Tag: Chidambaram

  • India at a Turning Point: The Decline of Naxalism and the Road Ahead

    A discussion is scheduled to be held in Parliament on March 30 regarding the measures being taken by the government to eradicate Maoist extremism. In this context, the reported imminent surrender of top Maoist leader Muppala Lakshmana Rao (Ganapathi) is being viewed as a potentially decisive moment. Union Home Minister Amit Shah has reiterated the government’s commitment to eliminate Maoist extremism by March 31, 2026. Recent developments—including the killing of several senior leaders in 2025 and the surrender of nearly 4,000 cadres—indicate that sustained security operations and policy measures have significantly weakened the movement. If Ganapathi surrenders, it would represent not only a strategic setback but also a major symbolic blow to the Naxalite movement.

    The Naxalite movement traces its origins to the 1967 uprising in Naxalbari, where peasants revolted against feudal landlords. Inspired by Maoist ideology, leaders such as Charu Majumdar and Kanu Sanyal mobilized marginalized communities around demands for land redistribution and social justice. Over time, the movement spread across states like Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha, and Telangana, forming what came to be known as the “Red Corridor.” The formation of the Communist Party of India (Maoist) in 2004 sought to consolidate the insurgency, though internal divisions had already begun to weaken its cohesion.

    Over the decades, the movement fragmented due to ideological differences, leadership rivalries, and disagreements over strategy. Some factions advocated immediate armed revolution, while others emphasized mass-based political mobilization. Disputes over tactics—including the targeting of civilians—further eroded unity. Even after consolidation attempts, splinter groups continued to emerge, weakening the movement’s overall strength and coordination.

    This fragmentation was accompanied by a steady erosion of public support. While the movement initially drew legitimacy from its opposition to exploitation and inequality, its increasing reliance on violence, extortion, and coercive control alienated the very communities it claimed to represent. As a result, public perception has shifted significantly: encounter deaths of Maoist leaders no longer evoke widespread sympathy, and in many areas, there is growing acceptance—if not quiet support—for state action aimed at restoring stability and enabling development.

    Despite this decline, the persistence of the movement was rooted in structural issues such as land inequality, displacement of tribal populations, governance deficits, and lack of economic opportunities. These conditions enabled Maoists to sustain support in certain pockets and continue guerrilla operations for decades.

    The government’s response evolved significantly over time. Under P. Chidambaram, a coordinated national strategy was introduced that combined security operations with development initiatives. Measures such as synchronized inter-state operations, strengthening of central forces, expansion of intelligence networks, and programs like the Integrated Action Plan aimed to improve infrastructure and governance in affected regions.

    Building on this foundation, the government under Narendra Modi, with Amit Shah leading internal security efforts, has adopted a comprehensive, time-bound, and highly coordinated strategy to eliminate Naxalism. This approach has emphasized close cooperation with state governments, expansion of security infrastructure, improved connectivity, and the implementation of the SAMADHAN doctrine. The increasing use of advanced technologies—including surveillance drones, cyber intelligence, and systems influenced by international practices—has further constrained the operational space available to Maoist groups. In an era of digital monitoring, maintaining secrecy and sustaining long-term insurgency has become significantly more difficult.

    A clear indication of the movement’s internal crisis is the surrender of senior Maoist leader Mallojula Venugopal Rao, who described the CPI (Maoist) as a “failed experiment.” He acknowledged that the movement failed to adapt to changing conditions, underestimated the strength of the Indian state, and gradually lost its social base due to its own mistakes. His appeal to cadres to lay down arms reflects a broader shift within the movement itself.

    Another dimension shaping the trajectory of Naxalism has been its romanticisation by sections of intellectual and cultural circles. In its early decades, it was often portrayed as a heroic struggle against injustice. While such narratives drew attention to genuine social issues, they also created an idealized image of armed revolution that did not align with ground realities. This sometimes misled sections of youth, who were drawn by ideological appeal but later confronted the harsh realities of violence, isolation, and limited outcomes. Over time, the gap between romantic portrayals and lived experiences contributed to disillusionment.

    As the movement declines, previously inaccessible regions—particularly in mineral-rich states like Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, and Odisha—are opening up for economic and industrial activity. Improved security conditions have reduced operational risks for businesses, enabling infrastructure projects and attracting investment in sectors such as mining, manufacturing, logistics, and telecommunications. This has the potential to generate employment, boost local economies, and integrate remote regions into the national development framework.

    However, this transition also brings important responsibilities. Sustainable progress will depend on ensuring that development does not replicate past patterns of displacement and exploitation. Fair compensation, environmental protection, and meaningful engagement with tribal communities are essential to maintaining long-term stability and preventing the re-emergence of unrest.

    In conclusion, the Naxalite movement has evolved from a peasant uprising in Naxalbari into a major insurgency and now into a weakened, fragmented, and increasingly isolated force. The combined impact of internal divisions, declining public support, sustained security operations, and technological advancements suggests that India may be approaching a decisive turning point. However, the lessons of the past remain crucial. The government must ensure that the conditions which once enabled exploitation and alienation do not re-emerge in new forms. Preventing exploitative practices, safeguarding the rights of vulnerable communities, and ensuring equitable and inclusive development are essential—not only to consolidate current gains but also to ensure that discontent does not give rise to similar movements in different forms in the future.

  • India’s Uneasy Balancing Act in the Trump Era

    A close reading of the India–US agreement makes it evident that New Delhi is unwilling to treat US President Donald Trump as an adversary. Keen to prevent any further deterioration in bilateral relations, India appears to have adopted a cautious and conciliatory approach. The United States has already imposed tariffs of up to 50% on Indian exports, severely impacting textiles, jewellery, engineering goods and chemicals. India’s trade deficit is widening, and a series of unilateral statements by Trump have pushed Prime Minister Narendra Modi into a defensive posture at home, where he faces questions he is increasingly unable to answer. This appears to have prompted efforts to placate the US President.

    Two months ago, US Senator Lindsey Graham, a close ally of Trump, told reporters aboard Air Force One that Indian Ambassador Vinay Kwatra had met him, conveyed that India had reduced oil imports from Russia, and urged him to persuade Trump to lower tariffs. Trump, standing beside him, warned that unless India completely stopped purchasing Russian oil, matters could worsen. “India wants to make me happy. Modi is a good man. He knows I’m not happy — and making me happy is very important. If India doesn’t help on the Russian oil issue, tariffs could be increased,” Trump said. The warning came shortly after the US attack on Venezuela, highlighting the pressure India was facing.

    Why should a US President certify India’s Prime Minister? Why should India align its policies to suit Washington’s preferences? Why should Modi seek to “please” Trump? These are questions India appears unwilling — or unprepared — to raise. Despite being larger than the European Union in scale, India does not seem ready to assert that it fears no one and can independently determine its foreign policy and internal security priorities. The ideals of non-alignment and strategic autonomy appear absent from current decision-making.

    At an RSS event marking its centenary year on Saturday, RSS chief Mohan Bhagwat underscored that while economic interdependence among nations is a reality, it must be voluntary and not driven by coercion. He cautioned against decisions imposed through trade wars and tariff pressure, arguing that international trade should be guided by a country’s free will. Agreements, he said, should not be entered into out of helplessness. He clarified that Swadeshi does not mean isolation or a blanket ban on imports.

    Against this backdrop, attention has turned to what Bhagwat may say about the recently announced draft India–US agreement. Many observers suspect the deal was not concluded on equal terms. Notably, even before the draft was officially announced, Trump unilaterally disclosed its details in a Truth Social post, stating that India would stop buying Russian oil and instead source oil from Venezuela. Prime Minister Modi promptly endorsed the announcement and expressed satisfaction, later being felicitated at an NDA meeting.

    Subsequently, US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer and Agriculture Secretary Brooke Rollins outlined the agreement’s details. Only thereafter did Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal address the issue, stating that Modi had leveraged his personal friendship with Trump to secure a favourable deal. Critics argue this framing overlooks the fact that agreements are concluded between nations, not individuals. It is India’s 1.4-billion-strong market that gives it negotiating strength — not personal rapport. After all, the India–US civil nuclear agreement was not a personal arrangement between Manmohan Singh and George W. Bush.

    Even with Trump reducing tariffs to 18%, questions remain about the deal’s benefits. Prior to July 2025, Indian exports to the US faced an average tariff of just 3%. The new rate represents a sixfold increase in less than a year. Meanwhile, India has reduced tariffs on American products such as Harley-Davidson motorcycles and several alcoholic beverages. Though US goods earlier faced tariffs averaging around 15% in India, these duties will now be eliminated.

    Goyal claimed the agreement would open the $30 trillion US market to Indian exporters, benefiting MSMEs, farmers and fishermen, and generating millions of jobs for women and youth. However, he avoided questions on the reported halt to Russian oil imports. External Affairs Ministry spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal maintained that India accords the highest priority to the energy security of its 1.4 billion citizens.

    Under the agreement, American products will enter India at zero tariffs, while the US will impose an 18% duty on Indian textiles, garments, leather, footwear, plastic and rubber goods, organic chemicals and select machinery. Generic pharmaceuticals, gems and jewellery, diamonds and aircraft parts will be exempt. India has committed to purchasing $500 billion worth of US goods, but the agreement does not specify reciprocal US purchases from India.

    The Congress party criticised the deal, alleging it was unequal and that India had opened its agricultural market to the US at zero tariffs. Congress spokesperson Pawan Khera described it as “Narender Surrender,” claiming it would enable dumping of American goods in India. Former Finance Minister P. Chidambaram said the agreement appeared heavily tilted in Washington’s favour, while former Union Minister Jairam Ramesh warned that India’s imports from the US could triple, erasing its long-standing trade surplus.

    Whether the government’s claims or the opposition’s criticism prove accurate remains to be seen.

    Meanwhile, there is little indication of any softening in the US stance on visa issues affecting Indians. Trump has significantly tightened visa norms, causing hardship for Indian professionals reliant on H-1B visas and for Indian students. Visa renewals now take years, and it remains unclear whether the Prime Minister’s much-touted personal rapport with Trump will yield any relief.

    The economic and political consequences of the India–US agreement, many argue, are likely to be far-reaching.