akrishnarao

Tag: Congress

  • India at a Political Crossroads

    “Be extremely cautious while speaking about the theft of money from the donation boxes (hundis) at the Ram Temple in Ayodhya. This incident has hurt the entire Hindu community and the BJP. It happened because of a few wrong individuals. The government will not spare the culprits,” BJP National President Nitin Nabin said two days ago at a meeting of key party leaders in Uttar Pradesh. His remarks themselves reveal how deeply the incident has shaken the BJP.

    In fact, the thefts in Ayodhya came to light just as Prime Minister Narendra Modi was preparing for a major reshuffle in both the BJP organization and the Union government, including appointments of office-bearers and changes in the Cabinet. Before the upcoming Parliament session, Modi had intended to give both the party and the government a fresh shape. Several rounds of high-level discussions had already taken place.

    The very fact that the Prime Minister was planning a large-scale Cabinet reshuffle suggests that he was not fully satisfied with the performance of several ministries. He held lengthy review meetings with Cabinet ministers and Ministers of State, both individually and collectively, signaling that changes were inevitable. Reports suggesting that key ministers—including the Finance Minister and the Education Minister—might be shifted indicate dissatisfaction with the functioning of their departments.

    It is also noteworthy that Morning Consult, which has consistently reported rising approval ratings for the Prime Minister, has now indicated a decline from around 75–78% to 68–70%. It is therefore understandable that Modi would want to proceed cautiously. However, whether because he felt the timing was not right or due to internal challenges, the proposed reshuffle now appears to have been postponed. According to official sources, several ministers who feared removal have, for the time being, breathed a sigh of relief.

    Ayodhya is not the only issue. One controversy after another continues to emerge across the country.

    A dispute has arisen over the University Grants Commission’s equity regulations. The prestigious NEET-UG medical entrance examination has been rocked by allegations of irregularities and repeated paper leaks. Supporting protesting students, a prominent educationist and environmental activist from Ladakh has been on a hunger strike at Jantar Mantar for the past eight days.

    The government’s E20 ethanol blending policy has also come under severe criticism. Opponents argue that the policy threatens food security and allege that certain ministers have vested interests influencing policy decisions.

    Meanwhile, the ₹90,000-crore Great Nicobar Mega Infrastructure Project in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands has become the subject of intense controversy between the Centre, environmentalists, and opposition parties. Critics claim that the project would require cutting down nearly 15 million rare rainforest trees, damage fragile coral reefs and marine ecosystems, and threaten the survival of indigenous tribal communities. Against this backdrop, the recent removal of several officials from the Union Environment Ministry has also attracted considerable attention.

    The opposition is likely to use all these issues to create disruptions during the upcoming Monsoon Session of Parliament. But the question is: where is the opposition?

    Major constituents of the INDIA alliance—including the Trinamool Congress, Shiv Sena, and Aam Aadmi Party—have been weakened by large-scale defections, raising concerns about their political survival. In Tamil Nadu, after Congress aligned with TVK, the DMK has reportedly distanced itself from Congress. Sharad Pawar’s NCP is also facing an internal crisis. The Jharkhand Mukti Morcha’s position has become uncertain after it supported the BJP-backed independent candidate in recent Rajya Sabha elections. The Aam Aadmi Party has already declared that it is no longer part of the INDIA alliance.

    In these circumstances, even if Congress and a few other parties manage to disrupt Parliament for a day or two, the BJP may face little resistance in advancing its legislative agenda afterward.

    Against this backdrop, the weakening of the opposition ahead of the Monsoon Session and the changing composition of Parliament represent significant developments in Indian politics.

    Even more important is the government’s reported intention to reintroduce the 130th and 131st Constitutional Amendment Bills. The opposition had successfully blocked these bills in April and again during a subsequent special session. But the situation is different now.

    If these two bills are passed, they are expected to bring significant changes to India’s political and constitutional framework. Alongside the Constitutional Amendment Bill providing women’s reservation, the government is also preparing to secure the required two-thirds majority for a delimitation bill.

    If passed, the delimitation exercise would proceed based on the previous Census rather than waiting for the ongoing Census. The bill may also specify the exact increase in the number of parliamentary seats. Furthermore, many observers believe that the Delimitation Commission constituted by the government could redraw constituency boundaries in ways that benefit the ruling BJP.

    The proposed 130th Constitutional Amendment Bill is equally significant. It would reportedly provide for the immediate removal of a Prime Minister, Chief Minister, Union Minister, or State Minister from office if they are arrested in a serious criminal case and remain in jail for 30 days. Many believe this provision is primarily aimed at opposition chief ministers and ministers.

    If the government succeeds in establishing dominance in Parliament and securing passage of these constitutional amendment bills during the Monsoon Session, there may be few obstacles left to passing other major legislation. Most notably, it would pave the way for legislation enabling simultaneous elections under the “One Nation, One Election” proposal.

    BJP chief ministers across the country have already declared their readiness for simultaneous elections. Party strategists reportedly believe that implementing women’s reservation alongside simultaneous elections would significantly strengthen the BJP’s prospects of returning to power once again.

    If that happens, it would mark a major transformation in Indian democracy. BJP circles also reportedly view this as an opportunity to postpone the Assembly elections due in Telangana, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, and Rajasthan in 2028 until the next general election.

    This raises an important question: what will elections look like by 2029?

    The Congress does not appear to be taking seriously the possibility that the BJP could further consolidate its dominance in Parliament as several regional parties split or decline. Congress leaders seem to believe that if regional parties disappear, Congress itself will fill the vacuum.

    If that were to happen, India could gradually evolve into a two-party system. Whether the BJP or Congress, other parties could steadily weaken. Is such a development healthy for democracy? Would regional aspirations lose their place in Indian politics? These are questions that deserve discussion.

    The decline of Odia, Bengali, and Dravidian regional identity politics in electoral politics has contributed to these concerns. At the same time, another question must also be asked: have regional parties genuinely safeguarded regional aspirations? Or have parties willing to compromise anything for the survival of their leaders lost their credibility in the eyes of the people?

    It should not be forgotten that India has always functioned as a pluralistic democracy. Even when the Congress was the dominant political force, it was never the only one. During Jawaharlal Nehru’s tenure as Prime Minister, Congress won 364 seats with about 46% of the vote, but opposition parties together secured 54% of the vote and won 125 seats. They represented a wide variety of social groups.

    From the second general election onward, the number of regional parties steadily increased. Even Congress recognizes that this happened largely because of its own arrogance and overconfidence during its years of dominance. As a result, Dravidian parties, socialist parties, and various regional and identity-based political movements emerged, becoming symbols of India’s diversity.

    At one stage, coalition governments at the national level appeared to be the country’s permanent political reality. Leaders like Atal Bihari Vajpayee viewed regional aspirations as an essential expression of India’s pluralism and federal spirit.

    Today, however, history appears to be moving in the opposite direction.

    Whether this trend is dangerous or healthy is not the central question. More troubling is the fact that the number of voices willing to ask difficult questions is steadily diminishing.

  • As Regional Parties Fade, a BJP–Congress Contest Looms

    A few days ago, Prime Minister Narendra Modi remarked that “the Congress is a parasite; it survives by depending on other parties and abandons them once its needs are fulfilled.” He may have made this comment keeping in mind the Congress party’s decision in Tamil Nadu to distance itself from the DMK and join hands with actor Vijay’s TVK. However, judging by the developments of the past few days, it has become impossible to predict how many parties will remain in the INDIA alliance or how many parties will remain in the National Democratic Alliance led by Modi by the time of the 2029 elections. Several regional parties are facing an existential test and must decide their future course, though they do not have much time to do so.

    In this context, the question arises: will the next general election witness a direct contest between the BJP and the Congress? The Congress does not appear particularly worried about regional parties splitting or aligning with the BJP. In fact, many regional parties have occupied the political space that once belonged to the Congress. The Congress also does not seem to be taking very seriously the BJP’s war-footing strategies to increase its strength in both Houses of Parliament. It appears that the Congress is moving with the objective of confronting the BJP directly by 2029. In particular, the party seems to be focusing on how to mobilize the youth.

    The Congress rarely appears to work according to a clear and consistent agenda. Until recently, it focused on caste census, social justice, and reservations. Now, observing growing unrest among the youth, it has begun efforts to attract them. It organized a massive rally titled “Chhatron Ki Goonj” in Kota, Rajasthan, where Rahul Gandhi addressed thousands of young men and women. The growing influence of the “Cockroach Janata Party” may also have strengthened Rahul Gandhi’s resolve to appeal to young voters. Several studies after the 2024 Lok Sabha elections indicated that in many states, women, youth, and especially first-time voters favored the BJP. Will this situation change by 2029? Can the Congress regain its lost support among youth and women? This question is crucial to the party’s future.

    At the same time, the BJP’s intensive efforts to increase its strength in both the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha and to bring many parties to its side cannot be dismissed lightly. According to an RSS leader, the Hindutva agenda remains the BJP’s highest priority. Only by remaining in power not just in 2029 but for several more decades can that agenda be fully implemented. As part of this objective, the BJP has focused on many regional parties across the country. It is rapidly moving to absorb parties such as JD(U), Trinamool Congress, Shiv Sena, and NCP. In Tamil Nadu, the DMK; in Jharkhand, the JMM; in Telangana, the BRS; and in Delhi, the AAP are now facing a difficult test of deciding their future direction. The BJP’s strategy is to bring various parties to its side through persuasion or pressure in order to fulfill its broader agenda.

    To ensure that the 2024 election results are not repeated in 2029 and that it does not again face the risk of losing its majority, the BJP is taking rapid measures. Delimitation and women’s reservation are among the most important of these. It hardly needs to be said that the Modi government’s approach to constituency delimitation would be favorable to the BJP. The party appears determined to ensure that neither the Congress nor regional parties outside the NDA gain significant advantage from the exercise. The BJP is attempting to secure more seats in Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, and West Bengal, where it fell short of expectations in the last elections, and to gain additional seats in Bihar, Jharkhand, Haryana, Rajasthan, and other states through changes in geographical and demographic arrangements.

    The consequences of delimitation in Assam and Jammu and Kashmir are already known. In Assam, Muslim-majority constituencies in Lower Assam and the Barak Valley were divided, and the fragmented areas were merged with constituencies dominated by local populations. This caused severe damage to the Congress and the AIUDF. The increase in seats reserved for Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes benefited the BJP’s regional allies. Similarly, in Jammu and Kashmir, the number of Hindu-majority seats in Jammu increased relative to Muslim-majority seats in the Kashmir Valley. Furthermore, increasing the number of seats helps counter anti-incumbency against sitting legislators. By allocating newly created seats to youth, women, and newcomers, the BJP aims to maximize its majority.

    It is difficult to determine to what extent the Congress understands the BJP’s comprehensive strategies. The Congress campaign against the BJP remains largely centered on Narendra Modi. Instead of preparing itself ideologically to confront the growing influence of the RSS across the country, it raises unproductive debates such as whether the organization possesses formal registration. This creates doubts about whether the Congress truly understands the BJP’s strategies.

    Out of India’s 4,123 Assembly seats, the Congress holds only 662. The party failed to win even a single Assembly seat in five states. In states such as Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, and Odisha, it won less than ten percent of the seats. In the 2024 general elections, the BJP and the Congress directly contested 286 constituencies; the BJP won 180 and the Congress 83. Gaurav Gogoi, who serves as Deputy Leader in the Lok Sabha and PCC president, recently suffered a crushing defeat in the Assam Assembly elections. Another Lok Sabha member and two-time Chief Minister, V. Vaithilingam, the Puducherry PCC president, even lost his deposit in the previous Assembly elections.

    Why is the Congress unable to convert anti-incumbency sentiment into political gains? Until it answers this question, no number of rallies or dramatic displays will strengthen the party. Regional parties face the same problem, and many of them are also splitting. Rather than merely blaming the BJP, the leaders of these parties must honestly examine why these divisions are occurring and why people are turning against them. What is the present condition of the Left parties, which were once strong ideological forces?

    The reality is that regional strongholds based solely on a single leader’s charisma or caste equations are collapsing rapidly. It is becoming clear that political ambitions unsupported by ideology cannot succeed indefinitely. This explains why the futures of Mamata Banerjee, Sharad Pawar, Uddhav Thackeray, Arvind Kejriwal, K. Chandrashekar Rao, Naveen Patnaik, and Jagan Mohan Reddy appear uncertain. None of the regional giants currently enjoys overwhelming influence. The conduct of successors in some parties also appears unpromising. As one analyst observed, these are not ordinary developments but indications of deep structural changes taking place within India’s political system.

    Although the BJP revolves around Modi, it is not a Modi-dependent party. Numerous powerful forces behind the BJP ensure that its strategies, expansion, and actions align with long-term objectives. Both the RSS and the BJP understand that Modi is merely an important instrument in achieving these goals.

    The same cannot be said about the Congress. Under its dynastic leadership, there is little evidence that Rahul Gandhi is attempting to build a strong organizational and ideological structure that extends to every village and transforms the Congress into an overwhelmingly popular mass party. It has been demonstrated repeatedly that power cannot be attained merely through the opponent’s weaknesses, mistakes, or anti-incumbency.

    There is little reason to fear that India’s political system is collapsing. In reality, it is undergoing a phase of reorganization. As regional voices weaken, it is increasingly evident that future elections may witness a principal contest between two national poles. Regional forces struggling for survival may inevitably gravitate toward one of these poles. Delimitation and the absorption of regional forces may naturally increase the Congress’s seat tally to some extent. However, if it wishes to create a political wave and capture power, politics must once again be shaped by influential national ideologies rather than individual leaders.

  • The Lotus Emerging from Bengal’s Cultural Roots

    “I will not resign. It is not the BJP that has defeated me, but the Election Commission,” declared Trinamool Congress leader Mamata Banerjee after the electoral setback. For years, many believed that the Trinamool Congress’s hold over Bengal—strengthened by welfare politics, village-level networks, and appeals to Bengali identity—would remain unshaken. The state’s complex social fabric, including the decisive influence of minority votes in several constituencies, further reinforced that assumption.

    Yet the Bharatiya Janata Party’s rise in West Bengal marks one of the most significant political developments in post-independence India. Overcoming deep-rooted regional loyalties and decades of ideological resistance, the BJP transformed itself from a marginal force into a major political contender in Bengal. To its supporters, this was not merely an electoral breakthrough but the re-emergence of a long-suppressed nationalist current within Bengal’s political consciousness.

    In many ways, Bengal’s historical and cultural evolution always contained strands that could eventually align with the BJP’s ideological narrative. Bengal has never been untouched by religious or identity politics. The 1905 partition of Bengal by British Viceroy Lord Curzon triggered the Swadeshi movement and ignited a powerful wave of anti-colonial nationalism. Long before independence, Bengal had already become a battleground of competing religious, cultural, and political identities.

    Thinkers and spiritual leaders such as Ramakrishna Paramahamsa, Swami Vivekananda, and Bankim Chandra Chattopadhyay profoundly shaped Bengali consciousness. Vivekananda envisioned Bengal’s youth as custodians of India’s spiritual resurgence, while Bankim Chandra’s writings fused cultural pride with patriotic fervor. His novel Anandamath became closely associated with early nationalist sentiment.

    Bengal also produced some of the fiercest critics of both colonial rule and mainstream Congress politics. Revolutionary figures such as Sri Aurobindo, Chittaranjan Das, and Subhas Chandra Bose challenged conventional political approaches and inspired militant nationalism. During Partition, communal violence—including the Calcutta killings and the Noakhali riots—left deep scars on Bengal’s collective memory.

    It was in this atmosphere that Syama Prasad Mukherjee emerged as a major political figure. Opposing both communal violence and special constitutional status for Kashmir, Mukherjee later founded the Bharatiya Jana Sangh, the ideological predecessor of today’s BJP.

    Despite these historical undercurrents, Bengal did not embrace the BJP for decades. Instead, the state evolved into one of India’s strongest centers of liberal, intellectual, and left-wing politics. Bengal nurtured social reform movements, literary modernism, trade union activism, and revolutionary thought. The Congress once dominated the state, only to decline before the rise of the Left Front, which ruled for more than three decades. Later, the Trinamool Congress under Mamata Banerjee displaced the Left and established its own political dominance.

    At the same time, Bengal remained a cradle of artistic and intellectual achievement. From Rabindranath Tagore to generations of filmmakers, musicians, actors, and writers, Bengal became synonymous with cultural sophistication, pluralism, and ideological debate.

    The BJP’s advance into such a political landscape therefore raises an important question: what changed?

    Part of the answer lies in long-term organizational work. The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh steadily expanded its grassroots presence across Bengal over several years. The BJP combined this organizational machinery with a carefully crafted political narrative centered on nationalism, border security, religious identity, and allegations of minority appeasement under the Trinamool Congress government.

    Another major controversy during the elections was the debate surrounding the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls and the role of the Election Commission. Opposition parties, especially the Trinamool Congress, alleged that large-scale deletions of voter names disproportionately affected minority-dominated districts such as Murshidabad, Malda, and North 24 Parganas. The BJP, however, defended the exercise as a necessary step to remove duplicate and ineligible voters and to strengthen the integrity of the electoral process. The controversy intensified political polarization, with the opposition accusing the Election Commission of acting in a partisan manner, while the BJP projected the revision as part of a broader campaign against illegal infiltration and electoral manipulation. Regardless of the competing narratives, the issue became a crucial psychological and political factor shaping the atmosphere of the election.

    The party also demonstrated a level of electoral planning and discipline that many opposition parties struggled to match. Having already secured close to 40 percent of the vote share in previous parliamentary and assembly elections, the BJP focused on incremental expansion constituency by constituency. Elections were approached not merely as campaigns but as highly coordinated political operations involving booth management, cadre mobilization, and targeted messaging.

    Former CPI(M) leader Sitaram Yechury himself acknowledged that even sections of traditional Left voters had shifted toward the BJP in recent years. This reflected not only ideological polarization but also the collapse of older political structures that once anchored Bengal’s electoral landscape.

    The opposition now faces a broader national challenge. Regional leaders who once treated Congress as politically irrelevant increasingly recognize the need for coordination against the BJP. Yet the Congress party continues to struggle with organizational weakness, inconsistent strategy, and the absence of a durable grassroots network comparable to that of the BJP.

    The contrast between the two parties is striking. The BJP invests continuously in cadre-building, ideological outreach, and local organizational structures. Congress, by contrast, often appears reactive rather than strategic. Electoral alliances and parliamentary tactics alone cannot compensate for the absence of sustained grassroots engagement.

    This is perhaps the larger lesson emerging from Bengal. Modern politics is not sustained by rhetoric alone. It requires organization, ideological clarity, long-term planning, and the ability to emotionally connect with voters across social divisions. One may agree or disagree with the BJP’s politics, but its capacity to build a disciplined political machine is difficult to ignore.

    Whether Bengal’s political transformation represents a temporary shift or a deeper civilizational realignment remains uncertain. But one fact is clear: Bengal, which has repeatedly shaped the course of Indian political history, is once again at the center of a major national turning point.

  • How long will these unethical politics continue?

    Leaders exchanging party scarves during symbolic switch from AAP to BJP
    Leaders symbolically switch from Aam Aadmi Party to Bharatiya Janata Party

    On the last day of the election campaign, Prime Minister Narendra Modi confidently declared, “After May 4, I will have to come to Bengal once again for the swearing-in ceremony of a BJP government.” He expressed confidence that “after Odisha and Bihar, the lotus will bloom in Bengal.” The Election Commission has deployed CAPF forces across Bengal. Union Home Minister Amit Shah said, “Even after the elections are over, these forces will remain in Bengal for another two months.”

    While Modi’s campaign efforts aim to attract the masses, especially women voters, Amit Shah, who stayed in Bengal for 15 days, is an expert strategist working at a micro level. This leadership duo prepares meticulous strategies well in advance to win a state. They craft narratives necessary for victory, employ all possible tactics—persuasion, incentives, division, and force—and make use of every system available. With 250,000 security personnel, Bengal has been turned into a battleground. Even after all this, can the BJP come to power in Bengal? If people desire change, if Hindu voters consolidate, if women support in large numbers, and if institutions fully cooperate, BJP’s victory is certain. However, if the people of Bengal view Mamata Banerjee as a symbol of their identity and resist Hindutva influence, the Trinamool Congress will return to power for a fourth consecutive term.

    In reality, even the Congress party under Rahul Gandhi does not want Mamata Banerjee to win in Bengal. When the Women’s Reservation Bill was collectively opposed in Parliament by the INDIA alliance, Trinamool supported it. The very next day, Rahul Gandhi toured Bengal and sharply criticized Mamata Banerjee’s corrupt governance. He argued that her policies are responsible for the consolidation of Hindu voters. While leaders like Tejashwi Yadav and Jharkhand Chief Minister Hemant Soren campaigned in her support, Congress and the Left parties strongly criticized her. This approach not only exposes divisions within the INDIA alliance but may also benefit the BJP to some extent. As Venkaiah Naidu once described, Congress behaves like “friendship in Delhi, wrestling in the streets.” While the BJP unites forces at both national and regional levels under the NDA, Congress has failed to build a strong coalition capable of challenging BJP across the country, highlighting its weakness.

    Not just with Mamata Banerjee, but even in the case of Kejriwal, Congress follows a similar approach. There are reasons for this, but it also reflects how independent regional parties in the country are becoming isolated and forced into defensive positions.

    Even as the Bengal elections are underway, a significant development is that seven Aam Aadmi Party MPs have joined the BJP. What does this indicate? Even before the current assembly battles conclude, BJP leaders have turned their attention to Punjab, where elections are due in eight months. Considering the growing anti-incumbency against the AAP government there, BJP seems to have devised a strong strategy to strengthen itself in the state. Though there are allegations that leaders like Raghav Chadha were pressured and others intimidated using ED and CBI cases, Kejriwal’s leadership style has also contributed to this situation. BJP is making every effort to weaken AAP, a one-man party, both in Punjab and Delhi, and to draw its leaders into their fold. This reflects BJP’s political strategy—using every possible tool to assert dominance and weaken opposition parties.

    The way AAP handled Rajya Sabha seats also contributed to this moral decline. Selling seats and later intimidating or re-buying those who purchased them is not difficult. By sidelining people like Yogendra Yadav, Prashant Bhushan, Ashutosh, and Shazia Ilmi and elevating industrialists and millionaires instead, AAP weakened itself morally. In contrast, Mamata’s party, though regional, sent individuals like journalist Sagarika Ghose, lawyer Menaka Guruswamy, and marginalized representative Mamata Bala Thakur to the Rajya Sabha. Similarly, CPI(M) sent journalist John Brittas from Kerala. Can BJP lure such individuals? This episode shows how carefully regional parties must choose whom they send to Parliament.

    The fact that seven AAP MPs left their party overnight to join another highlights how degraded Indian politics has become. Leaders like Raghav Chadha, who once labeled BJP as a party using agencies like CBI and ED as tools of intimidation, and Ashok Mittal, now joining BJP, what message are they sending? Are parliamentary seats being expanded just to accommodate such leaders? Rajya Sabha MPs are not directly elected by the people but chosen by party MLAs. When those MLAs remain in the same party, how is it legal for MPs to defect? The current anti-defection law appears not to prevent defections but to enable them through loopholes.

    When ideological commitment and political ethics are abandoned for selfish gains, can other systems remain unaffected? Recently, former U.S. President Trump calling India a “hellhole” was completely inappropriate. His remark recalls Russian writer Alexander Kuprin’s novel “The Pit,” which exposed prostitution. Kuprin’s observation—that systems often promote the very evils they claim to prevent—applies equally to the anti-defection law. The provision for “merger” within the law creates room for legal defections. The law mentions party merger but not parliamentary party merger. How can a parliamentary party be considered the real party? The Supreme Court’s constitutional bench in the Eknath Shinde case ruled that legislative or parliamentary parties cannot act independently of the political party’s stance. Should this not apply to the AAP MPs’ merger? As early as 2003, the Supreme Court clarified that defining a parliamentary party as the real party would render the Tenth Schedule meaningless. However, in 2019, the Bombay High Court’s Goa bench ruled differently, validating Congress defections as mergers. The Supreme Court’s delay in hearing the appeal rendered it irrelevant, as the assembly term ended and fresh elections were held in 2022. Now, it remains uncertain when the Supreme Court will address the petition challenging AAP’s merger into BJP in the Rajya Sabha.

    The BJP government claims to enact useful laws for the country, but why does it not introduce a law to curb unethical political defections? Until such a law is enacted, MPs and MLAs will continue defecting at will. BJP, which claims to be different, is behaving no differently from Congress, which once popularized the “Aaya Ram, Gaya Ram” culture. Its focus remains on winning elections and expanding nationwide rather than fostering ethical political values. It was Congress’s past mistakes that led people to embrace BJP. For years, people supported BJP despite its flaws, keeping Congress’s misdeeds in mind. However, just as medicine has an expiry date, political support too has a time limit. Until recently, Raghav Chadha enjoyed immense popularity on social media, but after joining BJP, over two million people distanced themselves from him. Once leaders begin to decline morally, it does not take long for people to see them as corrupt.

  • “Between Inclusiveness and Centralization: The RSS at a Crossroads”

    What direction does Mohan Bhagwat’s idea of “Sarvesham Avirodhena” — accepting everyone without opposition — suggest for India? The question has gained renewed relevance as the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) enters its centenary phase and its chief addresses diverse audiences across the country. His meetings are drawing an unusually wide cross-section of society. Academics, doctors, lawyers, business leaders, artists, poets, writers, sportspersons, actors, media professionals, former judges, and representatives of voluntary organizations have attended his interactions. Even individuals who once sharply criticized the RSS, as well as those who earlier remained neutral, are now seen at these gatherings. In Mumbai, prominent film personalities were present to listen to him, and in Hyderabad even left-leaning participants attended his address. The sheer diversity of attendees has itself become a subject of discussion, raising questions about whether this reflects ideological curiosity, political pragmatism, or a broader search for direction in uncertain times.

    “Accepting everyone without opposition” implies social harmony that transcends divisions of religion, caste, language, and class. It suggests that minorities are partners in the national journey rather than adversaries, that ideological diversity is natural in a plural society, and that the strength of the nation ultimately rests on the character and discipline of its citizens. Within the RSS framework, this aligns with its long-standing objective of organizing Hindu society. At the same time, Bhagwat has acknowledged that certain earlier hardline positions — particularly some formulations associated with M. S. Golwalkar’s book Bunch of Thoughts — were shaped by specific historical contexts and should not be treated as eternal doctrine. This acknowledgment is widely viewed as an effort to recalibrate ideological emphasis for contemporary India.

    The historical evolution of the RSS provides important perspective. The organization was founded in 1925 by K. B. Hedgewar. An often-overlooked detail is that Hedgewar continued as a member of the Indian National Congress until 1935, even after establishing the RSS. This reflects the fluidity of nationalist politics in the early twentieth century, when ideological boundaries were not rigid. The period witnessed internal debates between moderate and radical tendencies within the Congress, the emergence of Mahatma Gandhi as a mass leader, the formation of the Communist Party of India, the influence of global ideological currents, and powerful social reform movements.

    Among the most significant of these reform efforts was the Mahad Satyagraha of 1927 led by B. R. Ambedkar. At Mahad, Ambedkar mobilized Dalits to assert their right to draw water from a public tank, challenging the entrenched system of untouchability. The movement was a forceful assertion of equality and dignity within Hindu society. The RSS emerged in this broader atmosphere of social churning, when caste hierarchy, representation, and reform were intensely debated. Hedgewar’s emphasis on transcending caste divisions must therefore be understood within this larger historical context.

    After Hedgewar’s death, the RSS underwent further transformation. The distance between the Congress and the RSS widened as Jawaharlal Nehru adopted a European-influenced model of secularism, and the Quit India Movement spearheaded by Gandhi and Nehru sought to rejuvenate mass resistance against colonial rule. Under Golwalkar, the trauma of Partition and communal tensions sharpened the articulation of cultural nationalism. Later, under Balasaheb Deoras, the organization expanded its social and political engagement. Deoras maintained working relations with leaders across ideological divides, including Indira Gandhi and P. V. Narasimha Rao, reflecting a pragmatic openness to dialogue. He also played a role in facilitating the merger of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh with the Janata Party in the post-Emergency period, a development that eventually led to the formation of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). This phase demonstrated that the RSS could influence political realignments while retaining organizational distinctiveness.

    In contemporary India, however, the distinction between the RSS and the BJP is often blurred in public perception. Bhagwat has repeatedly stated that the RSS does not seek political power and should not be equated with the BJP. Yet the BJP’s prolonged tenure under Narendra Modi has given rise to what critics describe as a “one man–one party” model, where political authority and electoral appeal are highly centralized around a single leader. Symbolism has reinforced this perception. When Bhagwat was seen standing behind Modi during the Pranaprathista of Lord Sriram at the Ram Temple in Ayodhya, many observers naturally assumed that Bhagwat stands behind Modi in all his actions and decisions. Such imagery strengthens the impression that ideological and political authority function in close alignment, even if institutional distinctions are formally maintained.

    This generates a fundamental tension. If “Sarvesham Avirodhena” calls for inclusiveness and accommodation, can it coexist with a political structure that appears increasingly centralized? Supporters argue that decisive leadership is necessary in a complex global environment. Critics counter that inclusiveness requires institutional pluralism, space for dissent, and broader participation in shaping national priorities.

    Bhagwat’s recent remarks have also addressed economic and intellectual concerns. He has expressed reservations about uncritical globalization and about the long-term implications of the Indo–US strategic and economic relationship. Observers debate whether such engagements enhance India’s autonomy or deepen structural dependencies. At the same time, Bhagwat has emphasized the urgency of building strong indigenous research ecosystems. Cultural confidence, in his view, must be matched by sustained investment in knowledge creation and innovation. However, India continues to invest less than one percent of its GDP in research and development, and the country lags significantly behind China in scientific and technological advancement.

    Ultimately, Bhagwat’s articulation suggests a vision rooted in cultural nationalism, social cohesion, character building, intellectual self-strengthening, and broad societal outreach. Yet the credibility of “Sarvesham Avirodhena” will depend not merely on its rhetorical appeal but on how effectively it addresses caste inequities, minority concerns, centralized political authority, research deficits, and strategic economic choices. India stands at a transitional juncture reminiscent of earlier periods of ideological debate and reform.

    The final and perhaps most consequential question, therefore, is whether the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh under Bhagwat will actively shape this trajectory. Will it function primarily as a cultural and moral force, offering broad civilizational guidance while maintaining distance from day-to-day politics? Or will it intervene more directly in shaping policy priorities, influencing debates within the Bharatiya Janata Party, and moderating the balance between centralization and inclusiveness?

    If “Sarvesham Avirodhena” is to move beyond rhetoric, the RSS under Bhagwat may have to demonstrate through institutional conduct, public messaging, and social initiatives that inclusiveness is compatible with ideological conviction and strong leadership. Its engagement with questions of social harmony, minority outreach, caste reform, federal balance, and knowledge-driven development will be critical. In that sense, whether the RSS chooses to remain a guiding influence or becomes a more assertive actor may significantly shape how India’s democratic and civilizational journey unfolds in the decades ahead.

  • India’s Uneasy Balancing Act in the Trump Era

    A close reading of the India–US agreement makes it evident that New Delhi is unwilling to treat US President Donald Trump as an adversary. Keen to prevent any further deterioration in bilateral relations, India appears to have adopted a cautious and conciliatory approach. The United States has already imposed tariffs of up to 50% on Indian exports, severely impacting textiles, jewellery, engineering goods and chemicals. India’s trade deficit is widening, and a series of unilateral statements by Trump have pushed Prime Minister Narendra Modi into a defensive posture at home, where he faces questions he is increasingly unable to answer. This appears to have prompted efforts to placate the US President.

    Two months ago, US Senator Lindsey Graham, a close ally of Trump, told reporters aboard Air Force One that Indian Ambassador Vinay Kwatra had met him, conveyed that India had reduced oil imports from Russia, and urged him to persuade Trump to lower tariffs. Trump, standing beside him, warned that unless India completely stopped purchasing Russian oil, matters could worsen. “India wants to make me happy. Modi is a good man. He knows I’m not happy — and making me happy is very important. If India doesn’t help on the Russian oil issue, tariffs could be increased,” Trump said. The warning came shortly after the US attack on Venezuela, highlighting the pressure India was facing.

    Why should a US President certify India’s Prime Minister? Why should India align its policies to suit Washington’s preferences? Why should Modi seek to “please” Trump? These are questions India appears unwilling — or unprepared — to raise. Despite being larger than the European Union in scale, India does not seem ready to assert that it fears no one and can independently determine its foreign policy and internal security priorities. The ideals of non-alignment and strategic autonomy appear absent from current decision-making.

    At an RSS event marking its centenary year on Saturday, RSS chief Mohan Bhagwat underscored that while economic interdependence among nations is a reality, it must be voluntary and not driven by coercion. He cautioned against decisions imposed through trade wars and tariff pressure, arguing that international trade should be guided by a country’s free will. Agreements, he said, should not be entered into out of helplessness. He clarified that Swadeshi does not mean isolation or a blanket ban on imports.

    Against this backdrop, attention has turned to what Bhagwat may say about the recently announced draft India–US agreement. Many observers suspect the deal was not concluded on equal terms. Notably, even before the draft was officially announced, Trump unilaterally disclosed its details in a Truth Social post, stating that India would stop buying Russian oil and instead source oil from Venezuela. Prime Minister Modi promptly endorsed the announcement and expressed satisfaction, later being felicitated at an NDA meeting.

    Subsequently, US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer and Agriculture Secretary Brooke Rollins outlined the agreement’s details. Only thereafter did Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal address the issue, stating that Modi had leveraged his personal friendship with Trump to secure a favourable deal. Critics argue this framing overlooks the fact that agreements are concluded between nations, not individuals. It is India’s 1.4-billion-strong market that gives it negotiating strength — not personal rapport. After all, the India–US civil nuclear agreement was not a personal arrangement between Manmohan Singh and George W. Bush.

    Even with Trump reducing tariffs to 18%, questions remain about the deal’s benefits. Prior to July 2025, Indian exports to the US faced an average tariff of just 3%. The new rate represents a sixfold increase in less than a year. Meanwhile, India has reduced tariffs on American products such as Harley-Davidson motorcycles and several alcoholic beverages. Though US goods earlier faced tariffs averaging around 15% in India, these duties will now be eliminated.

    Goyal claimed the agreement would open the $30 trillion US market to Indian exporters, benefiting MSMEs, farmers and fishermen, and generating millions of jobs for women and youth. However, he avoided questions on the reported halt to Russian oil imports. External Affairs Ministry spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal maintained that India accords the highest priority to the energy security of its 1.4 billion citizens.

    Under the agreement, American products will enter India at zero tariffs, while the US will impose an 18% duty on Indian textiles, garments, leather, footwear, plastic and rubber goods, organic chemicals and select machinery. Generic pharmaceuticals, gems and jewellery, diamonds and aircraft parts will be exempt. India has committed to purchasing $500 billion worth of US goods, but the agreement does not specify reciprocal US purchases from India.

    The Congress party criticised the deal, alleging it was unequal and that India had opened its agricultural market to the US at zero tariffs. Congress spokesperson Pawan Khera described it as “Narender Surrender,” claiming it would enable dumping of American goods in India. Former Finance Minister P. Chidambaram said the agreement appeared heavily tilted in Washington’s favour, while former Union Minister Jairam Ramesh warned that India’s imports from the US could triple, erasing its long-standing trade surplus.

    Whether the government’s claims or the opposition’s criticism prove accurate remains to be seen.

    Meanwhile, there is little indication of any softening in the US stance on visa issues affecting Indians. Trump has significantly tightened visa norms, causing hardship for Indian professionals reliant on H-1B visas and for Indian students. Visa renewals now take years, and it remains unclear whether the Prime Minister’s much-touted personal rapport with Trump will yield any relief.

    The economic and political consequences of the India–US agreement, many argue, are likely to be far-reaching.