akrishnarao

Tag: amit shah

  • The Sangh and the Saffron Party: A Struggle for Ideological Course Correction

    Has there been a shift in the functioning of the Bharatiya Janata Party and the Union Government following the student protests in July that caused unprecedented shockwaves, the subsequent washed-out Monsoon Session of Parliament amid roaring slogans, and the trends seen in the by-elections across three Assembly constituencies including Bankipur? This has now become a major topic of discussion in the national capital. It goes without saying that the impact of these developments has also been felt deeply within the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). Seemingly startled by the changes taking place in society, the RSS has suddenly plunged into a massive nationwide mobilization drive aimed at youth and students. Thirty-two affiliate organizations of the RSS, including the BJP, are attending the three-day RSS All India Coordination Meeting (Akhil Bharatiya Samanwaya Baithak) held at Gudilova on the outskirts of Visakhapatnam. In these meetings as well, the primary agenda is: “How to improve engagement with Gen Z and the youth?” The Gudilova meetings are taking place at a time when a major internal overhaul within the RSS is slated for completion by March 2027 to present a brand-new face to the public under fresh leadership. These sessions are set to play a pivotal role in the Sangh’s evolution, with the distinct possibility of catalyzing a transformation within the Bharatiya Janata Party as well.

    There is no doubt that the developments over the twelve years since the BJP came to power at the Centre have also influenced the RSS. While some within the Sangh might view the BJP as just one of its 32 affiliates, one cannot discount that the BJP, governing at the Centre under Modi’s leadership over this decade-plus period, has reshaped the Sangh itself. Having Sangh functionaries step into every Union ministry is one aspect; having the Sangh bear responsibility for the government’s missteps and transgressions is quite another. The Sangh once held the distinction of compelling veteran BJP leader L.K. Advani to resign simply for visiting Pakistan and paying glowing tributes to Muhammad Ali Jinnah. But does the Sangh still possess the power to exercise such moral and ideological authority under current conditions? This is the question now being debated. Having once played a central role in government appointments, alliance decisions, and candidate selections, the key issue today is whether the Sangh can question or confront the government. RSS Sarsanghchalak Mohan Bhagwat has repeatedly stated that rulers must heed the concerns of students and youth, and that the Modi government must acknowledge mistakes made in policy decisions. Yet, to what extent is the government engaging in self-reflection? This cannot be ignored. Today, several opposition leaders, including Rahul Gandhi, are dragging both the BJP and the RSS into the political arena and questioning their ideological clarity, effectively putting them on trial before the court of public opinion. It is not just the opposition; even the general public is increasingly finding it difficult to tell the Sangh and the BJP apart. Against this backdrop, it remains to be seen whether the RSS can redefine its future ideological role and reshape its affiliate, the BJP, to meet future needs.

    In fact, a stage had arrived where the BJP argued it no longer needed the support of the RSS. During the 2024 Lok Sabha elections, the then BJP National President Jagat Prakash Nadda clearly stated: “In the beginning, when we lacked capability, we needed the RSS. Today, our party has expanded significantly and stands on its own feet. The BJP can run itself.” Thanks to Amit Shah’s strategic planning, the BJP emerged as the world’s largest party with 140 million members, constructing a massive apparatus capable of winning elections with ease. To make the BJP unchallenged, it succeeded in either subduing or splintering rival parties through persuasion or pressure. Consequently, despite securing only 240 seats in the 2024 elections, the leadership of Modi and Shah remained undisputed. Thereafter, by weakening opponents, it continued to win successive assembly elections, ultimately capturing Bengal as well. Many within the Sangh had little choice but to accept the leadership of Modi and Shah. Once a party emerges as an invincible force both internally and externally, which organization retains the ideological and moral authority to question its top leadership?

    Perhaps the emergence of the Cockroach Janata Party and the student protests provided an opportunity for introspection over these developments. For more than a decade, Modi crafted a political ideology and an accompanying vocabulary, unleashing it upon the world. The BJP maintained a well-oiled machinery to embrace this discourse and direct sharp attacks at rivals. Any doubt as to whether Modi created the BJP’s ideological foundation or whether it carried the Sangh’s blessings evaporated; in short, “Modi-ism” indisputably dictated the ideology of both the BJP and the Sangh. The same “ism” prevailed across all key appointments, from Chief Ministers and Union Ministers to the party’s National President.

    However, in the wake of the events in July, ideological analysts note a distinct Sangh imprint on the newly appointed team led by Nitin Nabin. Ideologue Ram Madhav, who remained distant from the BJP for nearly six years, was appointed as Vice President, while 11 out of 14 Vice Presidents and 11 out of 18 General Secretaries reportedly share a strong foundation in Sangh training. Furthermore, removing Amit Malviya—who headed the IT Cell for 11 years with a reputation for projecting any narrative as truth and launching aggressive attacks on opponents—and sidelining figures known for belligerent rhetoric like Tejasvi Surya are notable developments. Speculation suggests an effort is underway to steer the party away from Modi’s mindset and Amit Shah’s strategic style. Even so, will conditions return to the days when the BJP central office buzzed with healthy, regular interactions among party workers, media, and leaders like Venkaiah Naidu, Sushma Swaraj, Arun Jaitley, and Ananth Kumar? Turning back the clock is never easy.

    Surprisingly, during his 13th Red Fort address on the occasion of the 80th Independence Day, Prime Minister Narendra Modi devoted little time to recounting the achievements of the past 12 years. He did not walk the path of Nehru, who spoke to a young India in the language of scientific temper and modern nation-building. He did not echo Lal Bahadur Shastri’s call of “Jai Jawan, Jai Kisan.” Nor did he emulate Atal Bihari Vajpayee by adding “Jai Vigyan” to emphasize the primacy of science. He did not seek to unpack complex economic reforms in simple language like P.V. Narasimha Rao, nor did he discuss a knowledge-based economy like Manmohan Singh. Departing from all of them, Narendra Modi added a new phrase to the lexicon of Indian politics: Dimagi Naxal (an intellectual or ideological Naxalite). Yet, Modi offered no definition for the term. Do those who question an education system that fails to provide jobs, those who raise their voices against paper leaks and unfulfilled promises, and those who take to the streets not just at Jantar Mantar but in cities like Ranchi and Patna fall into this category? Modi knows how to battle legacy systems; in the past, he successfully branded rivals as “Lutyens,” “Andolan Jeevis,” or “Urban Naxals,” lumping them all under a single ideological label. But dismissing Gen Z with such tags will not be easy. Does warning the nation to stay vigilant against thoughtful, questioning citizens from within reflect the true national spirit? In an India recognized globally as an intellectual powerhouse that has produced CEOs for major global enterprises, who exactly is Modi worried about?

    After 12 years of uninterrupted rule, the new challenge Modi faces today is the inability to formulate an acceptable ideology and an appropriate vocabulary to match it. The primary reason is that neither the Bharatiya Janata Party nor the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh has consistently built a robust, clear, scientific, and modern ideology suitable for the new generation, leaving room instead for a politics of slogans and abuse. What the country urgently needs today is not individuals who revel in having their names chanted, but an ideology that moves in step with the times.

  • From Delhi to Patna: How Student Unrest Reshaped Bankipur

    Even though more than a week has passed since the agitation ignited in the national capital, Delhi, by thousands of students and other forces under the banner of the “Cockroach Janata Party” subsided, its tremors have not yet died down. The situation has not completely settled even after the resignation of Union Education Minister Dharmendra Pradhan. The Opposition is stalling Parliament, demanding a statement from Union Home Minister Amit Shah regarding the lathi charge and firing of pellets on the students. It is gathered that the government, unable to introduce key bills apart from minor and insignificant ones, is planning to adjourn Parliament indefinitely as early as possible. Chief Justice of India Justice Surya Kant—who commented two weeks ago, “Why are you showing us scenes of lathi charge on students? Don’t waste our time”—is now enabling the government to withdraw FIRs against the students. Since the Centre itself approached the Supreme Court in this matter, he appears to be offering the government a way to save face.

    On one side, although his fans and BJP leaders are abusing the students with various words, Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced with a very large heart that he has forgiven them. However, this announcement did not yield the expected positive results. Modi and Amit Shah are coming to Parliament, but they are not getting the opportunity to attend both Houses. Surprisingly, officials themselves say that the Home Minister is not coming to Kartavya Bhavan (the seat of the Home Ministry) at all, and is conducting one or two important meetings in his own room in Parliament. The only incident that made Modi very happy during this crisis was being entertained with songs, dances, and a torrential rain of praise on the occasion of the inauguration of Bhogapuram Airport in Andhra Pradesh. But as soon as he returned to Delhi, the situation returned to the same heat!

    It is unknown how long this troubled period will last, but many observers say that the results of the three Assembly by-elections held during this time indicate a coming change in the country’s politics—especially the election results of the Bankipur constituency in Bihar. Bankipur, a constituency under the Patna Sahib Lok Sabha area in the capital of Bihar, became the center of the Cockroach Janata Party agitation. Recently, when students took to the streets across several cities in the country during the NEET question paper leak, its intensity was seen severely in Patna. Demanding the resignation of Union Education Minister Dharmendra Pradhan, thousands of students residing in colleges and hostels centered in Bankipur marched out in a procession. Normal life came to a standstill on Ashok Rajpath and Boring Road, where a large number of coaching centers for students are located in the city.

    In Siwan and other key districts, the protest turned violent. Incidents such as lathi charges, stone-pelting, use of tear gas and water cannons, burning of police jeeps, and blockades of national highways took place. Videos of students being injured due to firing with AK-47s were circulated. Police barged into private hostels located in the narrow lanes of Bankipur, dragged out students who had come for coaching, and beat them severely. On the single day of the Bihar Bandh called on July 25, 690 people were detained. Murder charges were framed against many. The surprising fact is that while the Bankipur by-election was on July 30, the Bihar Home Department issued emergency orders on July 27 withdrawing all FIRs against the students. Yet, it was of no use.

    In March 1974, when Patna University students laid siege to the Assembly under the leadership of Jayaprakash Narayan, several students lost their lives in the firing and lathi charge carried out by the police. Afterwards, at a public meeting held at Gandhi Maidan in the presence of lakhs of people, JP gave a call for “Sampoorna Kranti” (Total Revolution). The statue of Jayaprakash built at the crossroads right next to the same Gandhi Maidan in Bankipur stands as a direct witness to recent events. In the surroundings of this area, known as JP Golambar, police once again pounced upon students. Before the Emergency, the JP movement spread from Patna to Delhi. Now, the Cockroach protest from Delhi echoed in the streets of Patna. It is no exaggeration to say that this echo decided the Bankipur election results.

    It goes without saying that in Bankipur, which had been in the BJP’s grip for the past three decades, the winner was not Prashant Kishor, leader of the Jan Suraaj Party that lost all its seats in the previous elections, but the students. It was only because he won five times from here that Nitin Nabin was able to become the BJP National President. The reason he gave up his MLA seat to choose the Rajya Sabha was that the top leaders of that party believed the BJP would win there effortlessly. The comment made by former Union Minister and Patna MP Ravi Shankar Prasad—”Even if a dog is fielded there, the BJP will make it win”—is proof of this. However, the BJP’s vote share plummeted from 62 percent to 34.4 percent in just one year! Because Kayasthas constitute 14 percent of the voters in Bankipur, Nitin Nabin used to win from there, as Bhumihars and Brahmins at 8 percent each, Rajputs at 7 percent, Kurmis at 5 percent, and Kushwahas at 3 percent also used to vote for him. In these by-elections, caste equations failed completely. These results must serve as an eye-opener to politicians who rely solely on caste equations!

    The Bankipur election results are merely a warning that the Bharatiya Janata Party must act with extreme caution hereafter in urban areas with high concentrations of middle-class and upper-caste populations. Bankipur made it clear that educated young voters in this country can influence election results. BJP leaders can no longer remain confident that urban areas like Lucknow, Prayagraj, Kanpur, and Noida in Uttar Pradesh, where elections are due in another seven to eight months, will remain their strongholds as in the past.

    Lekha Chakraborty, a prominent economist and professor at the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy (NIPFP) under the Union Ministry of Finance, attempted to scientifically analyze the students’ agitation. In a study, she expressed the view that just because individuals face similar problems, they do not fight spontaneously; when issues like paper leaks and job insecurity become strong motivators, combined with digital technology, youth unite on a massive scale. She stated that there is no connection between degrees and employment, and that only one-fourth of those with degrees get proper salaried jobs. One-third of the Periodic Labour Force lives on self-employment, and most of them depend on agriculture, earning low incomes.

    The ‘State of Working India 2026’ report released by Azim Premji University also confirms the study conducted by Lekha Chakraborty. It stated that although education has become accessible to sections that did not benefit in the past, meaningful opportunities to convert their qualifications into productive employment are not arising. These studies express deep concern over faculty leaving public universities, the decline in curriculum quality, and the falling value of degrees.

    They make it clear that advanced technology can reduce leaks and increase transparency, but it cannot create labor demand or restore the credibility of educational institutions. Economists themselves say that without increasing the education budget to 6 percent of GDP as recommended by the National Education Policy, and without properly building classrooms, providing teacher salaries and training, creating high-skilled jobs, and restoring the credibility of examinations, the problems cannot be solved. They warn that unresolved discontent provides continuous motivation to the people, and government suppression measures raise the danger level and strengthen collective unity.

    If politicians thought as scientifically as economists think, why would problems turn into crises and water flow under their rugs? Famous historian Will Durant did not remark in vain regarding the fall of the Roman Empire: “Great empires are not conquered from the outside; they destroy themselves from within.”

  • How long will these unethical politics continue?

    Leaders exchanging party scarves during symbolic switch from AAP to BJP
    Leaders symbolically switch from Aam Aadmi Party to Bharatiya Janata Party

    On the last day of the election campaign, Prime Minister Narendra Modi confidently declared, “After May 4, I will have to come to Bengal once again for the swearing-in ceremony of a BJP government.” He expressed confidence that “after Odisha and Bihar, the lotus will bloom in Bengal.” The Election Commission has deployed CAPF forces across Bengal. Union Home Minister Amit Shah said, “Even after the elections are over, these forces will remain in Bengal for another two months.”

    While Modi’s campaign efforts aim to attract the masses, especially women voters, Amit Shah, who stayed in Bengal for 15 days, is an expert strategist working at a micro level. This leadership duo prepares meticulous strategies well in advance to win a state. They craft narratives necessary for victory, employ all possible tactics—persuasion, incentives, division, and force—and make use of every system available. With 250,000 security personnel, Bengal has been turned into a battleground. Even after all this, can the BJP come to power in Bengal? If people desire change, if Hindu voters consolidate, if women support in large numbers, and if institutions fully cooperate, BJP’s victory is certain. However, if the people of Bengal view Mamata Banerjee as a symbol of their identity and resist Hindutva influence, the Trinamool Congress will return to power for a fourth consecutive term.

    In reality, even the Congress party under Rahul Gandhi does not want Mamata Banerjee to win in Bengal. When the Women’s Reservation Bill was collectively opposed in Parliament by the INDIA alliance, Trinamool supported it. The very next day, Rahul Gandhi toured Bengal and sharply criticized Mamata Banerjee’s corrupt governance. He argued that her policies are responsible for the consolidation of Hindu voters. While leaders like Tejashwi Yadav and Jharkhand Chief Minister Hemant Soren campaigned in her support, Congress and the Left parties strongly criticized her. This approach not only exposes divisions within the INDIA alliance but may also benefit the BJP to some extent. As Venkaiah Naidu once described, Congress behaves like “friendship in Delhi, wrestling in the streets.” While the BJP unites forces at both national and regional levels under the NDA, Congress has failed to build a strong coalition capable of challenging BJP across the country, highlighting its weakness.

    Not just with Mamata Banerjee, but even in the case of Kejriwal, Congress follows a similar approach. There are reasons for this, but it also reflects how independent regional parties in the country are becoming isolated and forced into defensive positions.

    Even as the Bengal elections are underway, a significant development is that seven Aam Aadmi Party MPs have joined the BJP. What does this indicate? Even before the current assembly battles conclude, BJP leaders have turned their attention to Punjab, where elections are due in eight months. Considering the growing anti-incumbency against the AAP government there, BJP seems to have devised a strong strategy to strengthen itself in the state. Though there are allegations that leaders like Raghav Chadha were pressured and others intimidated using ED and CBI cases, Kejriwal’s leadership style has also contributed to this situation. BJP is making every effort to weaken AAP, a one-man party, both in Punjab and Delhi, and to draw its leaders into their fold. This reflects BJP’s political strategy—using every possible tool to assert dominance and weaken opposition parties.

    The way AAP handled Rajya Sabha seats also contributed to this moral decline. Selling seats and later intimidating or re-buying those who purchased them is not difficult. By sidelining people like Yogendra Yadav, Prashant Bhushan, Ashutosh, and Shazia Ilmi and elevating industrialists and millionaires instead, AAP weakened itself morally. In contrast, Mamata’s party, though regional, sent individuals like journalist Sagarika Ghose, lawyer Menaka Guruswamy, and marginalized representative Mamata Bala Thakur to the Rajya Sabha. Similarly, CPI(M) sent journalist John Brittas from Kerala. Can BJP lure such individuals? This episode shows how carefully regional parties must choose whom they send to Parliament.

    The fact that seven AAP MPs left their party overnight to join another highlights how degraded Indian politics has become. Leaders like Raghav Chadha, who once labeled BJP as a party using agencies like CBI and ED as tools of intimidation, and Ashok Mittal, now joining BJP, what message are they sending? Are parliamentary seats being expanded just to accommodate such leaders? Rajya Sabha MPs are not directly elected by the people but chosen by party MLAs. When those MLAs remain in the same party, how is it legal for MPs to defect? The current anti-defection law appears not to prevent defections but to enable them through loopholes.

    When ideological commitment and political ethics are abandoned for selfish gains, can other systems remain unaffected? Recently, former U.S. President Trump calling India a “hellhole” was completely inappropriate. His remark recalls Russian writer Alexander Kuprin’s novel “The Pit,” which exposed prostitution. Kuprin’s observation—that systems often promote the very evils they claim to prevent—applies equally to the anti-defection law. The provision for “merger” within the law creates room for legal defections. The law mentions party merger but not parliamentary party merger. How can a parliamentary party be considered the real party? The Supreme Court’s constitutional bench in the Eknath Shinde case ruled that legislative or parliamentary parties cannot act independently of the political party’s stance. Should this not apply to the AAP MPs’ merger? As early as 2003, the Supreme Court clarified that defining a parliamentary party as the real party would render the Tenth Schedule meaningless. However, in 2019, the Bombay High Court’s Goa bench ruled differently, validating Congress defections as mergers. The Supreme Court’s delay in hearing the appeal rendered it irrelevant, as the assembly term ended and fresh elections were held in 2022. Now, it remains uncertain when the Supreme Court will address the petition challenging AAP’s merger into BJP in the Rajya Sabha.

    The BJP government claims to enact useful laws for the country, but why does it not introduce a law to curb unethical political defections? Until such a law is enacted, MPs and MLAs will continue defecting at will. BJP, which claims to be different, is behaving no differently from Congress, which once popularized the “Aaya Ram, Gaya Ram” culture. Its focus remains on winning elections and expanding nationwide rather than fostering ethical political values. It was Congress’s past mistakes that led people to embrace BJP. For years, people supported BJP despite its flaws, keeping Congress’s misdeeds in mind. However, just as medicine has an expiry date, political support too has a time limit. Until recently, Raghav Chadha enjoyed immense popularity on social media, but after joining BJP, over two million people distanced themselves from him. Once leaders begin to decline morally, it does not take long for people to see them as corrupt.

  • From Masterstroke to Misfire: The Amendment That Backfired

    The failure of the Constitution (131st Amendment) Bill, 2026 marks a significant political and constitutional moment. It demonstrates that even a strong executive cannot always secure its will, and that institutional checks within India’s parliamentary system remain robust. For Prime Minister Narendra Modi, whose style of governance has often been described as decisive and minimally consultative, this episode represents a rare but important setback.

    The Bill, widely expected to pass, fell short of the required two-thirds majority. While 298 members voted in favour and 230 against, it did not meet the threshold of 352 votes out of the 528 members present and voting. In response, the government chose to shelve not only the amendment but also the Delimitation Bill and the Union Territories Laws (Amendment) Bill, arguing that these measures were interconnected. Notably, this is the first time in over a decade in power that such a major legislative initiative has been blocked.

    The Opposition’s coordinated resistance played a crucial role. What initially appeared to be a foregone conclusion turned into a rare moment of unity among diverse political parties. Critics argue that the government’s approach itself contributed to this consolidation, as a top-down style of decision-making left little room for dialogue or consensus-building.

    Rahul Gandhi sharpened the political attack by likening the Prime Minister to a “magician” who had been “caught,” suggesting that the push to expand the Lok Sabha was driven by political calculations rather than genuine reform. According to the Opposition, the proposal sought to reshape India’s electoral map while simultaneously projecting a pro-women image through the reservation component.

    This episode raises a broader question: can strong, centralized leadership consistently deliver effective governance? While such leadership can accelerate decision-making, it may also limit consultation and erode consensus. The perception of “bulldozing” policies—whether accurate or not—can undermine democratic legitimacy. At the same time, it is important to recognize that this pattern is not unique to the current government. Indian political history offers several examples of unilateral decision-making, from the Emergency under Indira Gandhi to the Shah Bano legislation under Rajiv Gandhi.

    The proposal to introduce 33% reservation for women in legislatures is, in itself, a landmark reform. It addresses a long-standing structural imbalance in political representation and has the potential to significantly enhance women’s participation in governance. However, the timing and method of its introduction have raised legitimate concerns. Convening a special session of Parliament during ongoing assembly elections, rather than building broader consensus, invited suspicion about political motives.

    From an electoral perspective, the move is understandable. Women voters now constitute a decisive segment of the electorate, often turning out in greater numbers than men. Welfare policies targeting women have already proven electorally effective across several states. Expanding political representation could further consolidate this support. Even opposition resistance could be framed politically to mobilize women voters in favour of the ruling party.

    Yet, the linkage of women’s reservation with delimitation proved to be the most contentious aspect. Home Minister Amit Shah attempted to reassure critics by offering verbal guarantees that southern states would not lose proportional representation in an expanded Lok Sabha. He even proposed a temporary pause to revise the Bill. However, the Opposition rejected these assurances, pointing out that such safeguards were absent from the Bill’s text.

    As drafted, the proposal relied on the 2011 Census for delimitation, which would likely reduce the representation of states with lower population growth—particularly in southern and northeastern India—while increasing the share of the Hindi heartland. This raised serious concerns about federal balance and fairness.

    The urgency with which the government pursued the amendment further fueled criticism. With the 2026–27 Census still underway, many questioned the need to rush such a significant constitutional change. Linking a broadly supported reform like women’s reservation with a highly divisive issue like delimitation was seen by critics as a strategic miscalculation.

    The Opposition’s unified stance, particularly within the INDIA bloc, proved decisive. Parties such as the Congress, Trinamool Congress, DMK, and the Left coordinated effectively, setting aside differences. In contrast, regional parties like the TDP and AIADMK faced criticism for supporting the Bill based on assurances rather than textual guarantees, despite potential implications for their states.

    The defeat of the Bill has been framed by the Opposition as a victory for constitutional principles. Rahul Gandhi described it as a rejection of an “attack on the Constitution,” while Priyanka Gandhi Vadra emphasized the importance of separating women’s reservation from delimitation. These reactions highlight the broader political narrative that has emerged from the episode.

    Procedurally, the outcome underscores the strength of constitutional safeguards. Amendments of this nature require not only a majority of the total membership but also a two-thirds majority of members present and voting, along with ratification by at least half of the state legislatures in certain cases. These high thresholds are designed to ensure that major structural changes are enacted only with broad consensus—and in this instance, that safeguard functioned as intended.

    Looking ahead, the proposal to expand the Lok Sabha remains contentious. Critics argue that such a move, especially if based on outdated Census data, risks deepening regional imbalances and straining the federal structure. While women’s reservation enjoys wide support, delimitation is likely to remain a politically sensitive and divisive issue.

    Ultimately, the episode highlights a fundamental principle of democracy: process matters as much as outcome. Even well-intentioned reforms can lose legitimacy if they are perceived as unilateral or politically driven. The challenge for any government lies not only in pursuing reform but in building the consensus necessary to sustain it.

  • India at a Turning Point: The Decline of Naxalism and the Road Ahead

    A discussion is scheduled to be held in Parliament on March 30 regarding the measures being taken by the government to eradicate Maoist extremism. In this context, the reported imminent surrender of top Maoist leader Muppala Lakshmana Rao (Ganapathi) is being viewed as a potentially decisive moment. Union Home Minister Amit Shah has reiterated the government’s commitment to eliminate Maoist extremism by March 31, 2026. Recent developments—including the killing of several senior leaders in 2025 and the surrender of nearly 4,000 cadres—indicate that sustained security operations and policy measures have significantly weakened the movement. If Ganapathi surrenders, it would represent not only a strategic setback but also a major symbolic blow to the Naxalite movement.

    The Naxalite movement traces its origins to the 1967 uprising in Naxalbari, where peasants revolted against feudal landlords. Inspired by Maoist ideology, leaders such as Charu Majumdar and Kanu Sanyal mobilized marginalized communities around demands for land redistribution and social justice. Over time, the movement spread across states like Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha, and Telangana, forming what came to be known as the “Red Corridor.” The formation of the Communist Party of India (Maoist) in 2004 sought to consolidate the insurgency, though internal divisions had already begun to weaken its cohesion.

    Over the decades, the movement fragmented due to ideological differences, leadership rivalries, and disagreements over strategy. Some factions advocated immediate armed revolution, while others emphasized mass-based political mobilization. Disputes over tactics—including the targeting of civilians—further eroded unity. Even after consolidation attempts, splinter groups continued to emerge, weakening the movement’s overall strength and coordination.

    This fragmentation was accompanied by a steady erosion of public support. While the movement initially drew legitimacy from its opposition to exploitation and inequality, its increasing reliance on violence, extortion, and coercive control alienated the very communities it claimed to represent. As a result, public perception has shifted significantly: encounter deaths of Maoist leaders no longer evoke widespread sympathy, and in many areas, there is growing acceptance—if not quiet support—for state action aimed at restoring stability and enabling development.

    Despite this decline, the persistence of the movement was rooted in structural issues such as land inequality, displacement of tribal populations, governance deficits, and lack of economic opportunities. These conditions enabled Maoists to sustain support in certain pockets and continue guerrilla operations for decades.

    The government’s response evolved significantly over time. Under P. Chidambaram, a coordinated national strategy was introduced that combined security operations with development initiatives. Measures such as synchronized inter-state operations, strengthening of central forces, expansion of intelligence networks, and programs like the Integrated Action Plan aimed to improve infrastructure and governance in affected regions.

    Building on this foundation, the government under Narendra Modi, with Amit Shah leading internal security efforts, has adopted a comprehensive, time-bound, and highly coordinated strategy to eliminate Naxalism. This approach has emphasized close cooperation with state governments, expansion of security infrastructure, improved connectivity, and the implementation of the SAMADHAN doctrine. The increasing use of advanced technologies—including surveillance drones, cyber intelligence, and systems influenced by international practices—has further constrained the operational space available to Maoist groups. In an era of digital monitoring, maintaining secrecy and sustaining long-term insurgency has become significantly more difficult.

    A clear indication of the movement’s internal crisis is the surrender of senior Maoist leader Mallojula Venugopal Rao, who described the CPI (Maoist) as a “failed experiment.” He acknowledged that the movement failed to adapt to changing conditions, underestimated the strength of the Indian state, and gradually lost its social base due to its own mistakes. His appeal to cadres to lay down arms reflects a broader shift within the movement itself.

    Another dimension shaping the trajectory of Naxalism has been its romanticisation by sections of intellectual and cultural circles. In its early decades, it was often portrayed as a heroic struggle against injustice. While such narratives drew attention to genuine social issues, they also created an idealized image of armed revolution that did not align with ground realities. This sometimes misled sections of youth, who were drawn by ideological appeal but later confronted the harsh realities of violence, isolation, and limited outcomes. Over time, the gap between romantic portrayals and lived experiences contributed to disillusionment.

    As the movement declines, previously inaccessible regions—particularly in mineral-rich states like Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, and Odisha—are opening up for economic and industrial activity. Improved security conditions have reduced operational risks for businesses, enabling infrastructure projects and attracting investment in sectors such as mining, manufacturing, logistics, and telecommunications. This has the potential to generate employment, boost local economies, and integrate remote regions into the national development framework.

    However, this transition also brings important responsibilities. Sustainable progress will depend on ensuring that development does not replicate past patterns of displacement and exploitation. Fair compensation, environmental protection, and meaningful engagement with tribal communities are essential to maintaining long-term stability and preventing the re-emergence of unrest.

    In conclusion, the Naxalite movement has evolved from a peasant uprising in Naxalbari into a major insurgency and now into a weakened, fragmented, and increasingly isolated force. The combined impact of internal divisions, declining public support, sustained security operations, and technological advancements suggests that India may be approaching a decisive turning point. However, the lessons of the past remain crucial. The government must ensure that the conditions which once enabled exploitation and alienation do not re-emerge in new forms. Preventing exploitative practices, safeguarding the rights of vulnerable communities, and ensuring equitable and inclusive development are essential—not only to consolidate current gains but also to ensure that discontent does not give rise to similar movements in different forms in the future.

  • “Beyond the Uproar: Elections Will Decide All”

    Elections have been announced in a Union Territory. Now everyone’s attention is on the developments taking place in the election-bound states. For the past two days, parliamentary proceedings have been running smoothly. The government and the Speaker agreeing to lift the suspension of eight MPs who were suspended in previous sessions is an indication that some understanding has been reached between both sides. However, no matter how much uproar is created in Parliament, or how stubbornly the government behaves, ultimately both the ruling party and the opposition must prove their strength before the people, right? Unless public anger against the government erupts and is reflected in election results, there is no benefit in stalling Parliament. After Parliament discussed and rejected the no-confidence motion brought against him over two days, Speaker Om Birla, upon resuming his seat, remarked, “These two days of the House’s time have been wasted.”

    It is surprising that the opposition was not even ready for voting on the no-confidence motion they themselves introduced. Wouldn’t it have been better if a message had gone out that 233 opposition members in the House opposed Om Birla? Perhaps the opposition feared that it would give an impression to the public that they are not united. It is noteworthy that MPs from the Samajwadi Party and Trinamool Congress did not sign the no-confidence motion. Even so, adhering to opposition dharma, they spoke in favor of it. While a discussion was supposed to take place on the no-confidence motion against Om Birla, insisting on discussing West Asia and stalling the House suggests that Congress was not serious about its own motion and had its reasons. Yet, their opposition is directed more at Modi than at Birla, isn’t it?

    In fact, Parliament provides an excellent platform for the opposition to clearly present their views and attract public attention. In the past, leaders like Hiren Mukherjee, Indrajit Gupta, Piloo Mody, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, George Fernandes, Sushma Swaraj, Arun Jaitley, and Venkaiah Naidu made remarkable speeches while in opposition, which established them as national leaders. Compared to them, it must be said that Rahul Gandhi has not yet emerged as a powerful orator in Parliament. It cannot be said that Congress lacks good speakers, but since Rahul Gandhi is the Leader of the Opposition, politics revolves around him. He seems to have developed a style of creating commotion by bringing up topics like Nirav or Epstein just moments after beginning to speak. Perhaps he is missing the opportunity to present the same issues in a powerful, flowing speech that could captivate not only members but the entire nation. On the other hand, Priyanka Gandhi Vadra, though she has delivered only a few speeches so far, has made them widely discussed. After she challenged, “Make all your criticisms against Nehru at once… let’s discuss them,” the ruling party’s criticism of Nehru in Parliament subsided. During the debate on the no-confidence motion against Om Birla, Trinamool MP and 33-year-old actress Sayoni Ghosh spoke so effectively and exposed the BJP’s stance in a way that no one had expected.

    The fortune of the Bharatiya Janata Party, especially Prime Minister Narendra Modi, lies in the fact that the opposition has not only failed to stand strong in elections but is also not effectively using Parliament as a platform. Even though there are many issues to criticize Modi on, Congress’s attacks are not reaching the public strongly. Interestingly, even in states where the BJP is not very strong, there are intellectuals who argue that Modi is extremely powerful. For example, in Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh, and Telangana, the BJP is not very strong. Yet, if two people from these regions talk for ten minutes, Modi’s name repeatedly comes up in their conversation. There are more people overestimating Modi’s strength than perhaps necessary. It is said that a German leader once remarked, “Even criticizing me is a crime, and ignoring me is also a crime!” This situation is perhaps pushing Modi to consider simultaneous elections.

    Coming to the southern states, after losing in Karnataka in 2023, the BJP has not yet recovered and is struggling with internal conflicts. B. S. Yediyurappa has completed 50 years in politics but has made it clear that he is not ready to retire. Just as there is uncertainty at the national level about who will succeed Modi, in Karnataka too it is unclear who will lead after Yediyurappa. Even BJP leaders themselves cannot say whether the party will strengthen in Karnataka by the next elections. In Telangana, everyone knows the BJP is struggling to rise above the third position. In Kerala, which is heading into assembly elections, it is not easy to predict whether the BJP will increase its vote share or win even ten seats. In Tamil Nadu, the confusion within the BJP is evident from its own actions. Despite attempts to split the AIADMK or promote Annamalai, the BJP has not gained strength. Ultimately, it has had to ally again with the AIADMK and depend on the seats given by it, even resorting to moves like offering the Deputy Chief Minister post to actor Vijay, who is new to politics. No matter how much the BJP expands in northern India, the people of the southern states have not yet embraced it. It is leaders who are welcoming it with shawls, not the people!

    At the national level, the BJP’s strategy broadly includes consolidating Hindu votes, pursuing politics in the name of nationalism, and projecting Modi as a strong leader. However, in states like West Bengal, Assam, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, and Puducherry, where elections are being held, Hindutva politics is not as strong as in the north and west. A form of sub-nationalism exists in these states, similar to Andhra Pradesh and Telangana. Therefore, making BJP-style politics succeed in these states is a real test for the party and for Modi. The BJP knows that fighting regional parties is not as easy as fighting Congress. Moreover, in states where the BJP has won, even relatively unknown leaders have been accepted as Chief Ministers. But such a situation does not exist in the current election-bound states. When L. K. Advani was BJP president, strong leadership was built in every state, including leaders like Modi. Today, Modi does not have leaders at either the national or regional level who can stand beside him and draw public applause. This is both his strength and his weakness.

    In the southern states, apart from marginally increasing vote share and maintaining alliances, there is little the BJP can achieve. Winning West Bengal is a major challenge for Modi. Modi and Amit Shah are making every possible effort to defeat Mamata Banerjee this time. They are well aware that Hindutva politics alone cannot secure victory in Bengal. Efforts such as revising voter lists and allegedly removing over six million voters, replacing the governor with IPS officer R. N. Ravi, making administrative changes, conducting ED raids, and consolidating Hindu votes are all being undertaken. Addressing a rally at Kolkata’s Parade Ground a day before the election announcement, Modi expressed concern that Hindus might become a minority in Bengal. The BJP’s strength in Bengal is gradually increasing. However, Modi and Amit Shah failed to defeat Mamata Banerjee in 2016 and 2021. Now they are facing her for the third time. Although they could not defeat Arvind Kejriwal in Delhi in 2015 and 2020, they managed to secure victory in 2025 on the third attempt. Will they be able to repeat that success in Bengal this time? Can Bengal be compared with Delhi? In any case, past elections are one thing, and the upcoming elections are another. These elections can be seen as a trial by fire for the strategies Modi has pursued over the past twelve years. Will Modi be able to withstand the challenges emerging at both national and international levels, counter questions about his policies, and outmaneuver opposition strategies to stand tall like a formidable leader?

  • What does Nitish’s exit indicate?

    This is a story from two decades ago. In January 2006, an unprecedented Congress Party plenary was held at the Balayogi Auditorium in Hyderabad. Chief Minister Y. S. Rajasekhara Reddy and his associate K. V. P. Ramachandra Rao worked day and night to make the plenary a grand success. Congress president Sonia Gandhi was delighted after seeing the arrangements made in Hyderabad. After that, speculation arose that KVP would surely get a Rajya Sabha seat in the upcoming elections. When the time for selecting candidates approached, one day I asked AICC general secretary Digvijaya Singh, and he said that KVP had a good chance of getting the Rajya Sabha seat. I wrote that as a news report.

    The next day, when the media met Digvijaya Singh, a colleague asked him, “A report has come that KVP will be given a Rajya Sabha seat. Is he the one getting it?” Digvijaya Singh laughed and asked, “Who told you that? By the way, who is KVP?” Within a single day the mood of the Congress high command had changed. Some of YSR’s rivals in Delhi had told Sonia all sorts of things and changed her mind. In those days the Congress was in power in about 16 states. For every small matter YSR had to explain himself to Delhi. He had to wait another two years before his close confidant could get a Rajya Sabha seat.

    Compared with YSR’s situation then, the present Telangana Chief Minister Revanth Reddy can be described as extremely powerful. YSR could not get a Rajya Sabha seat immediately for his right-hand man even after asking, but Revanth succeeded in securing one for Vem Narender Reddy. Though YSR had been a loyal Congress leader for decades, even when he wanted his brother Y. S. Vivekananda Reddy to resign so that his son Y. S. Jagan Mohan Reddy could get the Kadapa seat, the high command did not agree. It took YSR many years to win over the Congress leadership. After his death, the high command did not hesitate to file cases against his son.

    But what is the secret behind Revanth Reddy’s success? Within four years of joining the Congress he became PCC president, and within another four years he became Chief Minister. Not only in the Rajya Sabha seat issue but in many matters he has been able to make the high command accept his word.

    Just as the unanimous election of Vem Narender Reddy to the Rajya Sabha from Telangana carries political significance, the decision of Bihar Chief Minister Nitish Kumar to contest for the Rajya Sabha also has equal importance. One development reflects the changed culture of power within the Congress, while the other reflects the expanding political dominance of the Bharatiya Janata Party across the country.

    Even leaders within his party are still shocked that Nitish Kumar, who served as Chief Minister of Bihar for nearly two decades and played a key role in the NDA’s victories, gave up the post. In internal meetings of the Janata Dal (United), several leaders questioned his decision. Party workers vandalized the JD(U) office outside Nitish Kumar’s residence at 1 Anne Marg. They raised slogans saying unknown conspirators were behind his resignation. Until recently no one imagined that Nitish’s son Nishant would enter politics. Moreover, Nitish himself had strongly criticized dynastic politics on several occasions. Even though he says he is voluntarily going to the Rajya Sabha, anyone observing the present course of national politics understands that his resignation as Chief Minister was not a natural development.

    In fact, it is believed that the BJP had long been writing the script for Nitish to leave Patna and move to Delhi. Reports say that after Union Home Minister Amit Shah’s three-day tour of the Seemanchal region in the last week of February and his discussions with party leaders, the decision was finalized. Through intermediaries Nitish was reportedly told that he had no option but to step aside. The BJP, which has already consolidated its hold over the Hindi belt, has long been strategizing to completely capture Bihar as well. Many political observers believe that this development happened because the BJP has begun moving its pieces to ideologically take control of Bihar, thereby tightening its grip over power politics across northern India.

    With about 18 percent Muslims and a border with Bangladesh, it would not be surprising if the BJP wanted to turn Bihar into a laboratory for Hindutva and nationalism. Some have even described this development as a bloodless coup. The social forces unleashed in Bihar through Mandal politics had brought leaders like Lalu Prasad Yadav and Nitish Kumar—disciples of socialist leader Karpoori Thakur—to prominence. They had given a sense of dignity to backward classes and emerged as forces that could not be ignored.

    There is historical significance in the BJP coming to power in the same Bihar where Lalu Prasad Yadav had once stopped L. K. Advani’s Ram Rath Yatra. Analysts say that Nitish Kumar—who created the conditions that eventually allowed the BJP to come to power there—now giving up his position for the party could herald major political developments across the country.

    The Janata Dal, which emerged in 1988 under the leadership of V. P. Singh against the Congress, has a long history. In 1989 it played a key role in the National Front government in which the Telugu Desam Party was a partner. In 1991 it emerged as the third largest party. In the United Front government that came to power in Delhi after P. V. Narasimha Rao, the Janata Dal was again a crucial participant. Later it split into several factions but survived in the form of parties such as Biju Janata Dal in Odisha, Janata Dal (Secular) in Karnataka, Rashtriya Janata Dal in Bihar, and Janata Dal (United).

    But now, with JD(U) handing over power in Bihar to the BJP, political observers believe this marks the final chapter in the history of the Janata Dal. The political strategies used by the BJP to weaken Janata Dal factions in Odisha and Karnataka are already recorded in history. Lalu Prasad Yadav, who was once part of the old Janata Dal, has retired from active politics after getting entangled in corruption cases. Ram Vilas Paswan has passed away. The final phase of the Janata Dal (United) under Nitish’s leadership has now begun.

    The Bihar elections held last year were fought entirely under Nitish’s leadership. Though the BJP initially hesitated to project him as the chief ministerial candidate, it later had to compromise. They entered the election with the slogan “Pachchis se Tees (from 2025 to 2030), once again Nitish.” Yet, even with four years remaining in the term, Nitish’s rule has ended within just four months. Amit Shah himself stood beside him when he filed his nomination for the Rajya Sabha.

    In fact, though the BJP won more seats than JD(U) in both the 2020 and 2025 elections, it continued to keep Nitish as Chief Minister out of political necessity. If it has now decided to assume power itself, it means Nitish must have been completely neutralized. His attempts to touch Narendra Modi’s feet during the NDA meeting in 2024 and again at the Patna airport after his swearing-in are cited as examples. His ill health also added to his weakness.

    Nitish Kumar, who broke away from Lalu Prasad and built his own party, is not an ordinary politician. In the early days he conducted “Janata Darbars” and personally resolved people’s grievances. Brick by brick he brought extremely backward non-Yadav groups closer to him. He earned the title “Sushasan Babu.” He also gained strong support from women. During his 20-year rule he brought at least some change to Bihar. Although in the last elections the JD(U) won only four seats fewer than the BJP, the latter seems to have gained confidence that it can take control of the party and run politics in Bihar on its own, and also attract all the social groups that Nitish had mobilized.

    After the NDA’s victory in Maharashtra in 2024, the BJP sidelined Eknath Shinde, the leader of the Shiv Sena breakaway faction who had been Chief Minister until then, and installed its own leader as Chief Minister. Though a similar formula was applied in Bihar, Nitish Kumar was allowed to continue as Chief Minister for four months. In the BJP, touching feet or excessive praise does not change the party’s assessment of individuals.

    Above all, the BJP’s determination to establish a two-party system in the country has now materialized in Bihar. Just as the BJP is confronting the Samajwadi Party in Uttar Pradesh and the Trinamool Congress in West Bengal, it is moving in the same direction across the country. Preparing for the simultaneous elections expected in 2029 in a presidential-style contest, Narendra Modi is positioning himself as an unbeatable leader on one side.

    But whom are the opposition parties preparing to face him? And in this battle, what will be the future of other regional party leaders?

  • Telangana Checkmates BJP

    It was reported in the media that on December 11, 2025, Prime Minister Narendra Modi, in a review meeting with his party leaders, expressed dissatisfaction with the performance of BJP MPs from Telangana. The meeting appears to have conveyed a clear message to Telangana BJP leaders: set aside internal differences, work as a united team, strengthen grassroots outreach, and make better use of social media to improve the party’s prospects in the state. Modi is said to have remarked that although the party has strong potential in Telangana, leadership weaknesses and internal factionalism are weakening it. Despite having eight MPs and two Union Ministers, the party has not effectively played the role of a strong opposition, he reportedly observed.

    But what happened in the recent municipal elections held for seven corporations and 116 municipalities in Telangana? The BJP, which emerged as the single largest party in neighbouring Maharashtra elections, secured third place in Telangana with just 15.68 percent of the votes. With eight MPs — half of the total Lok Sabha seats from the state — and an equal number of MLAs, the party won only 259 wards and not even a single municipality. The saffron party’s performance in other municipalities falling under the Lok Sabha constituencies represented by its MPs has been dismal. Though the BJP has the potential to grow in Telangana, especially after its good Lok Sabha results, it has not fully capitalized on the opportunities. However, strong local leaders have made some difference in places like Karimnagar and Nizamabad, but this will not be sufficient to give a tough fight in the next Lok Sabha elections.

    The municipal results followed strong performances in recent Panchayat elections, where Congress-supported candidates secured approximately 66 percent of Gram Panchayats statewide. In an Assembly segment-wise analysis, Congress secured majorities in 68 out of 81 constituencies where municipal elections were held. After forming the government on December 7, 2023, Congress also won the Cantonment by-election and the Jubilee Hills by-election. This indicates that both urban and rural voters are increasingly supporting Congress.

    The credit goes to Mr. Revanth Reddy, the Chief Minister of Telangana, who has been able to stop the juggernaut of the BJP in the state, despite the Prime Minister himself showing keen interest in Telangana. Under his leadership, the Congress party has demonstrated its strength convincingly. These elections were held at a time when there was widespread speculation in political circles that public dissatisfaction with the Revanth Reddy government was growing. The principal opposition, BRS, had been strongly criticizing the government and claiming that its end was near. Given that the government had completed two years, interest in the municipal results was high, and doubts were raised about Congress’ prospects.

    However, contrary to predictions, Congress performed well. Though leaders like KTR may not acknowledge the importance of the results, it is significant for a party like Congress, which is often known for internal dissent, to achieve this level of success. Revanth Reddy’s strategy ensured favorable outcomes across both North and South Telangana. Districts like Nizamabad, Adilabad, and Karimnagar, previously considered strongholds of BJP and BRS, saw gains for Congress. Even in his home district of Mahabubnagar, where BRS appeared strong, Congress made inroads.

    The Congress party attributes its success to development and welfare initiatives under Chief Minister Revanth Reddy, such as ₹17,000 crore spent on urban development, 200 units of free electricity for poor families, free RTC bus travel for women, issuance of 30 lakh ration cards, expansion of Rajiv Aarogyasri coverage from ₹5 lakh to ₹10 lakh, construction of 3,500 houses per constituency, and the Young India Integrated Schools initiative.

    Apart from its socio-economic agenda, it seems that Revanth Reddy adopted a clever strategy of not completely annihilating the BRS. He understands that if the BRS is finished, it would create space for the BJP to rise. He instead put the BRS on the defensive by exposing alleged corrupt practices such as the Kaleswaram project and the telephone tapping controversy. It is a strategy similar to the one adopted by KCR a few years ago, when he allowed the BJP to rise after sensing that Revanth Reddy was gaining momentum in the state as a Congress leader.

    The Telangana setback for the BJP has come at a time when the party is facing pressure from opposition parties at the national level over issues such as General Naravane’s book, Indo-US trade matters, and elections in five states. The political graph of Narendra Modi appears to be facing challenging weather, and the Modi-Shah duo are trying their best to prevent it from declining.

    Revanth Reddy has shown the Congress party a path forward. The Congress should not confine itself to parliamentary tactics alone; it must reach out to the people on issues such as farmers’ concerns, price rise, and unemployment, and strengthen the party at the grassroots level.